Therefore, we may be closer to “Safety II” than to “Safety I,” even though we appreciate what is good about both views of the world. And we have suggested that people use root cause analysis proactively to analyze success and failure since the early 1990s. When did we recognize this? Since TapRooT® RCA was first developed in the late 1980s. TapRooT® Root Cause Analysis doesn’t fall into the “Safety I” trap that the academics mentioned because we recognized resilience (but we never called it that) and humans as an active part of a successful system. This poor thinking includes poor accident models (their examples: the Domino Theory and Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model) and linear cause-and-effect thinking in root cause tools (they mentioned TRIPOD, AcciMap, and STAMP as being defective). The authors lay the blame for accidents in complex systems on poor thinking. They called their “new” discovery and new ways to improve safety performance “Safety II.” They implied that it is clearly superior to “Safety I.” The academics discovered that many root cause systems only look at failures rather than failures and successes. I had read about Safety II before and know the academics, but I thought that it was time to write a little about what I’ve observed – KISS or Keep It Simple Stupid. One of our TapRooT® Instructors sent me a white paper written by three research academics about resilience and the human being a flexible part of the system. J| Mark Paradies Safety II and KISS – Keep It Simple Stupid! Safety II vs.
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